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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: Case No. 20000107-CA 
vs. 
SHEPARD WHEELER, Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for attempted unlawful possession or use 
of a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 
58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2000), in the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable 
J. Dennis Frederick presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL and STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Sentencing in absentia, a. Did the sentencing court commit plain error by 
finding that defendant's absence at sentencing was voluntary, where defendant had notice 
of the hearing and was free to attend, but did not? 
To establish plain error, an appellant must demonstrate three elements: (i) An error 
occurred; (ii) the error was obvious; and (iii) the error was harmful. State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). If any one of these elements is missing, there is no plain 
error. Id. at 1209. 
b. Did defense counsel perform ineffectively when he did not object to defendant's 
being sentenced in absentia? 
Where an ineffectiveness claim is first raised on direct appeal, this Court "must 
decide whether defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel as a matter 
of law." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 466 (Utah App, 1993). 
2. Alleged facts in mitigation, a. Did the sentencing court deny defense counsel 
and the prosecutor the opportunity to present information in mitigation, thereby committing 
plain error? 
See standard of review for issue no. l.a. 
b. Did defense counsel perform ineffectively by not advising the sentencing court 
of allegedly mitigating material of which it was already aware? 
See standard of review for issue no. 1 .b. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Resolution of this case involves interpretation of the following provisions: 
Utah R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2). 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally present at the trial with 
the following exceptions: 
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's 
voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for trial 
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shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered 
therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present; . . . 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a)&(b). 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the 
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor 
more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the concurrence 
of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court may commit the 
defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity 
to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of punishment, 
or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. The prosecuting 
attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any information material 
to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, 
defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a defendant fails 
to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be issued by the court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Charges. Defendant was charged by information with unlawful possession of 
a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2000), and giving false identity to a peace officer, a class C misdemeanor, 
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-507 (1999) (R. 2). 
Plea hearing* On 3 December 1999, defendant pled guilty to attempted possession 
of a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor, and the remaining count was dismissed 
(R. 18-25,27-28). 
In the plea hearing, defense counsel stated that the prosecution was "going to be 
recommending affirmatively alcohol and drug treatment as well as mental health counseling" 
(R. 53: 3). The prosecutor countered that no such recommendation was reflected in his 
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file (id). The court noted, "Well—but, if they chose not to, that would be a worthwhile 
recommendation in any event which would have, however, no punitive [e]ffect on the 
Defendant's status here before me today" (id). Defense counsel also informed the court 
that her client "has some brain damage, so I took a little extra time [going over the Statement 
of Defendant with him]" (R. 53: 4). 
The court accepted defendant's guilty plea and informed him that sentencing was 
set for 7 January 2000 (R. 53: 8-9). The court released defendant and ordered Adult 
Probation and Parole (AP&P) to prepare a presentence report (R. 27). Defendant was 
also given written notice that sentencing would be on 7 January 2000 (R. 26). 
AP&P scheduled interview appointments for 22 December and 28 December, but 
defendant, who was not incarcerated, failed to attend either (R. 29). Accordingly, AP&P 
could not complete the presentence report as ordered (id). The court issued a non-bailable 
warrant for defendant's arrest (R. 30-31). 
Sentencing. A sentencing hearing was held on 7 January 2000 (R. 53:11). Defendant 
was not present (R. 33). Defense counsel stated that predecessor counsel "informed me 
that she has not been in touch with him and that he is not here this morning" (R. 53: 
11). The court found that defendant had voluntarily absented himself from the proceedings 
and sentenced defendant to one year in jail (R. 33-34). 
Findings. The court entered findings of fact and conclusion of law, finding as 
follows: 
4 
2. That Defendant was verbally informed of the sentencing date 
of January 7, 2000, at 8:30 a.m., before this Court, after he entered his plea 
of guilty. 
3. That Defendant was given written notice of the sentencing date 
after he entered his plea of guilty. 
5. That Defendant was not present before this Court on January 
7, 2000, at 8:30 a.m., nor did he appear at any time during the Morning 
Criminal Calendar. 
6. That counsel, Charles B. Corry, was present on January 7, 2000, 
during the Morning Criminal Calendar and the latter had no explanation why 
Defendant was not present in Court. 
7. That Defendant voluntarily, and without valid excuse, absented 
himself from the presence of this Court on January 7, 2000, during the Morning 
Criminal Calendar. 
(R. 35-36). Defendant timely appealed (R. 40). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
According to the probable cause statement, on 13 October 1999, defendant was 
stopped for crossing a street against the light (R. 3). A consent search discovered cocaine 
(id). At his plea hearing, defendant admitted that he had "intentionally, knowingly attempted 
to possess a controlled substance, specifically cocaine" (R. 53: 7). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Sentencing in absentia, a. Defendant claims plain error occurred when the 
trial court concluded it could sentence him in absentia. However, "a defendant not accused 
of a capital crime waives his right to be present at sentencing by voluntary absence." 
State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah 1996). The trial court found that defendant 
was voluntarily absent at sentence. The record reflects that defendant was given both 
oral and written notice of the sentencing hearing and was at liberty to attend the hearing. 
Thus, the court committed no error—clear, plain, or otherwise. 
b. Since the court properly sentenced defendant in absentia, defense counsel was 
not ineffective for not objecting. 
2. Presentation of alleged facts in mitigation, a. Defendant argues the sentencing 
court committed plain error under rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, by 
sentencing defendant without affording counsel an opportunity to present a plea bargain 
and evidence bearing on the sentence. This argument fails on several grounds. First, 
the trial court never refused to hear counsel; rather, counsel never requested to be heard. 
Second, the record does not establish that any plea bargain existed, only that defense 
counsel thought one did. Third, the sentencing court was already aware of all the issues 
defendant claims should have been presented at sentencing. 





BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS VOLUNTARILY ABSENT, 
SENTENCING HIM IN ABSENTIA WAS NOT PLAIN ERROR 
Defendant claims that "the Court erroneously concluded that it could sentence the 
Defendant in absentia." Br. Aplt. at 7. He asserts plain error, as he must since the claim 
is unpreserved. See id. at 8-9. By not objecting, defendant further claims, his counsel committed 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 7-8. 
A. The court did not plainly err by sentencing defendant in absentia. 
To establish plain error, an appellant must demonstrate three elements: (i) An error 
occurred; (ii) the error was obvious; and (iii) the error was harmful. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). If any one of these elements is missing, there is no plain error. 
Id. at 1209. 
"[A] defendant not accused of a capital crime waives his right to be present at sentencing 
by voluntary absence." State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah 1996). "On the same 
grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, defendant may likewise be 
sentenced in defendant's absence." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(b). In non-capital cases, "the 
defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for trial 
shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered therein shall 
have the same effect as if defendant had been present; . . ." Utah R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2). 
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Under rules 17 and 22, an absence is voluntary if the defendant has notice of the 
proceedings and is at liberty to attend in the sense that he is not incarcerated elsewhere. 
See Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110, 1111. 
Here, the trial court found that defendant 'Voluntarily, and without valid excuse, absented 
himself from the presence of this Court on January 7, 2000, during the Morning Criminal 
Calendar" (R. 35-36). Defendant's claim in effect challenges this finding of fact. 
This court will "review a trial court's findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard 
and will not upset them unless they are 'against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the 
appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."' 
State v. Murphy, 872 P.2d 480, 481 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting State v. Chavez, 840 P.2d 
846, 848 (Utah App. 1992), in turn quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). 
The finding at issue here was not clearly erroneous. Defendant received both oral and 
written notice of the hearing (R. 26, 53: 8-9). Though not incarcerated, he failed to attend 
two interviews with AP&P, resulting in a non-bailable warrant for his arrest (R. 29-31). 
No evidence contradicts the court's finding. Defendant concedes he had notice of 
the hearing. See Br. Aplt at 8. He also admits that the "reasons for his absence are unknown." 
Id. Although defendant raises "the possibility that he was incarcerated on another matter," 
id., the record does not support this speculation. On the contrary, AP&P informed the court 
that defendant was not in custody, at least as of 30 December 1999 (R. 29). 
Consequently, the court here committed no error, plain or otherwise. 
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B. Defense counsel was not ineffective for not objecting to defendant's 
being sentenced in absentia. 
To establish ineffective assistance, a defendant must show both that his counsel's 
performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the result of the 
trial or hearing. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The "proper standard 
for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance." Id. Thus, "the defendant 
must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." 
Id. at 688. 
'""The failure of counsel to make motions or objections which would be futile if raised 
does not constitute ineffective assistance.'"" State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, f34, 989 P.2d 
52 (quoting Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983) (quoting State v. Malmrose, 
649 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1982))). 
Since the court properly sentenced defendant in absentia, counsel's choice not to object 
was not ineffective. 
POINT II 
THE SENTENCING COURT DID NOT PREVENT COUNSEL FROM 
PRESENTING ANY INFORMATION UNKNOWN TO THE COURT 
Defendant claims that the sentencing court committed plain error under rule 22(a), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, by sentencing defendant without affording either the 
prosecutor or defense counsel an opportunity to present evidence bearing on sentence. See Br. 
Aplt. at 7. He further argues that his counsel was ineffective for not advising the court "that 
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the Defendant suffers brain damage and that the State agreed, pursuant to plea negotiations, 
to affirmatively recommend at sentencing that Defendant receive drug and alcohol treatment 
and mental health counseling." Id. at 8. 
A. The sentencing court did not deny counsel the opportunity to speak 
and, in any event, the court had already heard the information defendant 
now claims should have been presented. 
Defendant relies on rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Br. Aplt. at 
6. That rule provides, "Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an 
opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of punishment, 
or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). 
"The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any information material 
to the imposition of sentence." Id. 
Defendant has failed to demonstrate error, plain or otherwise. The trial court has 
substantial discretion in conducting sentencing hearings and imposing a sentence. See State 
v. Sanwick, 713 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1986); State v. Howell 707 P.2d 115, 117 (Utah 1985). 
As the transcript of this abbreviated sentencing proceeding demonstrates, the court never 
refused to hear counsel; neither attorney requested the opportunity to be heard (R. 53: 11-12). 
Nothing in the record establishes or suggests that had either counsel requested the opportunity 
the court would have denied it. 
Defendant has also fails to demonstrate prejudice. He claims prejudice because he 
was "sentenced to the maximum incarceration allowed by law [one year] rather than being 
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given the benefit of his plea agreement which included affirmative recommendation by the 
State that the Defendant be given an opportunity to receive drug and alcohol treatment and 
mental health counseling." Br. Aplt. at 9. 
The record does not support this claim. At the plea hearing, defense counsel stated 
that she "had not noticed this before, but if [the prosecutor] will look at his file and [prior 
defense counsel's] file notes, they are going to be recommending affirmatively alcohol and 
drug treatment as well as mental health counseling" (R. 53: 3). The prosecutor replied, "That 
is not reflected in mine. All that's reflected is just an offer of a Class A Misdemeanor" 
(id). Notes in the defense file, without more, do not constitute a plea agreement. Moreover, 
since the same judge sat at both the plea hearing and at sentencing (see R. 53), the court 
was necessarily aware of this issue. The same is true for defendant's claim to suffer from 
"some brain damage": it was mentioned at the plea hearing (R. 53: 4) 
Furthermore, even had the sentencing judge been reminded of these issues, defendant's 
absconding altered the sentencing calculus. The court "was entitled to aggravate appellant's 
sentence on the basis of his failure to appear." State v. Hoover, 728 P.2d 689, 691 (Ariz. 
App. 1986). "Actions such as appellant's absconding from the jurisdiction demonstrate a 
poor attitude and have been specifically held to provide appropriate bases for sentence 
aggravation." Id. Compare State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998) (stating that since 
the State did not charge defendant with bail-jumping, his absconding provided no "more 
than nominal support for the imposition of consecutive sentences"), with State v. Parsons, 781 
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P.2d 1275, 1282 (Utah 1989) (rejecting distinction between "criminal record" and "crimes 
not passed on by a court" in capital sentencing), and State v. Lipsky, 639 P.2d 174, 176 (Utah 
1981) (approving sentencing court's consideration of evidence of prior crimes of which 
defendant was acquitted). 
B. Defendant's ineffectiveness claim fails on the prejudice prong. 
Defendant claims that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance "when he failed to 
advise the Court that the Defendant suffers brain damage and that the State agreed, pursuant 
to plea negotiations, to affirmatively recommend at sentencing that Defendant receive drug 
and alcohol treatment and mental health counseling." Br. Aplt. at 8. 
The reviewing court should dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack 
of sufficient prejudice if doing so is the easier course. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Dunn, 
850 P.2d at 1226. It is the easier course here. 
The State denies that counsel was deficient. But even assuming arguendo that he was 
deficient in failing to advise the court of "some brain damage" suffered by defendant and 
of defense counsel's belief in a plea agreement, defendant suffered no prejudice (R. 53: 3). 
This is so because the court had already heard these claims at the plea hearing {see R. 53: 
3-4). Indeed, the only record source for this information is the above-quoted colloquy from 
a hearing presided over by the same judge who one month later sentenced defendant in absentia 
(see R. 53). Thus, the court was fully apprized of every allegation defendant now claims 
his attorney should have conveyed at sentencing. 
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Moreover, as noted above, the record does not establish that any plea agreement existed, 
only that one defense attorney believed that it did. Finally, any possibility that defendant 
would have received counseling in lieu of jail time evaporated when he demonstrated his 
unreliability by absconding. See Hoover, 728 P.2d at 691. 
The likelihood that a defendant subject to a non-bailable arrest warrant who fails to 
appear at sentencing will be placed on parole is remote, even if the judge is reminded that 
defense counsel thought she had a plea agreement and that defendant suffers from "some 
brain damage." 
Defendant's ineffective assistance claim thus fails. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
NO ORAL ARGUMENT OR PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED 
This appeal presents no issues of sufficient complexity or novelty to merit setting the 
matter for oral argument or issuing a published opinion. 




J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR 
Assistant Attorney General 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
\ND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
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OF LAW 
v S 
aseiNo. y-i^,i \^si> 
SHEPARD WHEELER 
n J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendant 
Defendant was scheduled to be senter** •• January 7, 2000, at *-"o -n, 
Defense Counsel, Charles B. Corry, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, >*&•• MI I t 
representing Defendant and the State of Utah was represented by Kenneth R. Updegrove, Deputy 
Salt Lake County District Attome) , Defendant < a s n :: t pi esent 
Based on the Court's record in the above entitled matter, the Court makes the following 
Findings of I'm I .mil,l "onclusionof Law. 
FINDINGS OF FAC I 
1. That Defendant entered a plea of guilty to Attempted Unlawful Possession of a 
ill I Substance, a Class A Misdemeanor, on December 3,1999, before the this Court. 
2. That Defendant was veroaiiy ranuary 7, 2000, 
at 8:3 0 a.m., before this Court, after he entered his plea of guilty. 
3. That Defendant was given written notice of the sentencing date after he entered 
his plea of guilty. 
0003? 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Case No. 991921193FS 
Page 2 
4. That when Defendant entered his plea of guilty on December 3, 1999, and was 
informed of the sentencing date, he was represented by counsel Deborah D. Kreeck-Mendez, 
also from the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association. 
5. That Defendant was not present before this Court on January 7, 2000, at 8:30 
a.m., nor did he appear at any time during the Morning Criminal Calendar. 
6. That counsel, Charles B. Cony, was present on January 7, 2000, during the 
Morning Criminal Calendar and the latter had no explanation why Defendant was not present in 
Court. 
7. That Defendant voluntarily, and without valid excuse, absented himself from the 
presence of this Court on January 7,2000, during the Morning Criminal Calendar. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Rules 17(a)(2) and 22(b), U.R. Crim. P., 
the Court concludes, as a matter of law, that Defendant may be sentenced on January 7, 2000, at 
8:30 a.m., without being present before the Court 
DATED this
 w _ _ _ _ _ 
BY TffiE COURT: 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 





Case No. 991921193FS 
Hon. J. Dennis Frederick 
The Court having reviewed the lnvv niJ having entered Findings of Fact and the 
Conclusion of Law based thereon: 
HEREBY ORDERS that Defendant be sentenced in absentia on January 7,2000, during 
the Morning Criminal Calendar. 
DATED thi 'Irdayof jM.s ^ 
THE,' 
2000 
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1 IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
2 SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
3 * * * 
4 :HE STATE OF UTAH, ) 
P l a i n t i f f , ) 
• nr, ) c a s e No. 991921193FS 
1
 aHhr'AAD WIIIFU.R, ) HEARINGS, 12 -3 -99 6 
) I 7 00 
Defendan t . 1 
11 BE IT REMEMBERED t h a t on t h t 3rd of 
12 December, 1999, 4 t h e 7 th of J a n u a r y , 2000, t h i s 
13 c a u s e came on fo r h e a r i n g s b e f o r e the HONORABLE 
J . DENNIS FREDERICK, D i s t r i c t C o u r t , w i t h o u t a j u r y 
jib in t h e S a l t Lake County C o u r t h o u s e , 1A lr Niire H tiy 
I'ft U tah . 
A I? P E A R A M C E S: 
For the S t a t e : KENNETH R. UP0E6ROVE 
PAUL PARKER 
Deputy D i s t r i c t Attorney 
IF" . ' • ..h • Dhitf n ! ,. r , : , BEVAM CORRY 
DEBORAH KREECK MEDEZ 
Deputy Legal Defender ! 
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.1 I R O C E E D I N U S 
2 THE COURT; All right Number 4 on the 
3 calendar, State of Utah v. Shepard Wheeler, Case 
4 No. CR99-1193. 
5 Ms. Kreeck-Mcndez, you are appe* 
6 this matter for the Defendant? 
? MS. KREECK MENDEZ: I am, Ms, Garland v 
8 actually his lawyer. I've talked to him, gone over 
9 this. He's fine with me handling this case. 
io THE COURT: Henceforth or for this 
11 morning? 
12 MS. KREECK MENDEZ: For this morning. 
J 3 THE COURT: You, sir, are Shepard 
14 Wheeler; is that correct? 
15 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Sir. 
16 THE COURT: And you understand 
17 Ms, Kreeck Mendcz is appearing for your lawyer, 
18 Ms. Garland? 
19 THE
 D E F E N D A N T : yes, SIT, i do. 
20 THE COURT: That's agreeable with you? 
21 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Sir. 
22 THE COURT: And, Mr. Parker, you are here 
23 on behalf of the State? 
24 MR. PARKER: I am. 
25 THE COURT: This matter is on the 
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1 calendar incident to an arraignment. Do you 
2 anticipate a continuing not-guilty plea or do you 
3 want a trial date? 
i MS. KREECK MENDEZ: No, Your Honor. He 
5 will plead guilty to Attempted Possession of a 
6 Controlled Substance, a Class A Misdemeanor. 
7 THE COURT: And to your knowledge, 
8 Ms. Kreeck Mendez, arc there any other 
9 representations being made by the State here in 
10 resolution of this claim? 
11 MS. KREECK MENDEZ: Your Honor, I haven"' t 
12 noticed this before, but if Mr. Parker will look at 
13 his file and Ms. Garland's file notes, they are going 
14 to be recommending affirmatively alcohol and drug 
15 treatment as well as mental health counseling. 
16 MR. PARKER: That is not reflected in 
17 mine. All that's reflected is just an offer of a 
18 Class A Misdemeanor. 
THE COURT: Well -- but, if they chose 
20 not to, that would be a worthwhile recommendation in 
21 any event which would have, however, no punitive 
22 affect on the Defendant's status here before me 
23 today 
?4 You have discussed the wisdom of this 
25 plea with your client, Ms. Kreeck Mendez? 
P a s e 4 
i IMS. KREECK MENDEZ: I have. 
2 THE COURT: And you've gone ova the 
3 Statement of the Defendant with him? 
4 MS. KREECK MENDEZ: I have. And, Y our 
5 Honor, he has some brain damage, so I took a little 
6 extra time. We talked about it, talked about it in 
? terms of the case and just - 1 carefully went 
8 through it in very simple terms. 
9 THE COURT: And you are persuaded 
10 therefore that he understand the effect and meaning , 
ii of what he's about to do here? 
12 MS. KREECK MENDEZ: I believe he does. 
J \ THE COURT: Mr. Parker, does that fairly | 
14 state the proposed resolution from your perspective 
is MR.PARKER: it does, Your Honor. 
i THE COURT: Mr. Wheeler, do you 
17 understand what's being proposed here? 
18 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I do. 
19 THE COURT: And you have talked this over 
20 with not one but probably both of your lawyers? 
21 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
22 THE COURT: And you've gone over the 
23 Statement of the Defendant with your lawyer, 
24 Ms. Kreeck Mendez? 
25 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I have. 
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1 THE COURT: And you understand that 
2 statement? 
3 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
4 THE COURT: Do you have any questions at 
5 all about it? 
6 THE DEFENDANT: NO, I don't. 
7 THE COURT: Have any threats or promises 
8 been made to you or against you to get you to enter 
9 this plea of guilty, other than what's been stated 
10 here in open court? 
11 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
12 THE COURT: In other words, you are doing 
13 this freely and voluntarily, Mr. Wheeler? 
14 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I am. 
15 THE COURT: You understand, as a criminal 
16 Defendant, by entering a plea of guilty you are 
17 waiving certain constitutional rights that you 
18 otherwise have? 
119 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
20 THE COURT: Including the right to be 
21 tried by a jury of eight people, the right to require 
22 the State to prove their case against you beyond a 
23 reasonable doubt, to the unanimous satisfaction of 
24 that jury of eight people, the right to confront and 
25 cross-examined witnesses produced by the Stale 
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1 against you, the right to compel the attendance of 
2 witnesses in your own behalf at no cost to you, the 
3 right to remain silent during the trial if you choose 
I 4 or to take the stand and testify in your own behalf 
J 5 if you chose, and the right to appeal in the event a 
6 jury finds you guilty of the charges that are tried; 
7 all of which rights as well as any others on that 
I 8 statement that we may not have now discussed, you are 
9 waiving by the entry of the guilty plea. Do you 
110 understand? 
II THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
12 THE COURT: And knowing of those waivers, 
113 do you want to proceed with this plea arrangement 
14 that the lawyers have worked out? 
15 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I do. 
16 THE COURT: And you are still doing this 
17 freely and voluntarily? 
18 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I am. 
19 THE COURT: Are you prepared to sign that 
20 statement at this time? 
21 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
22 THE COURT: YOU may do SO. 
23 The Defendant and both Counsel have 
24 signed the Statement of the Defendant. 
25 Mr. Wheeler, you understand by having 
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1 signed this statement you are admitting as true and 
2 correct the following facts and elements involved in 
3 the Class A Misdemeanor crime of Attempted Possession 
4 of a Controlled Substance? 
5 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
6 THE COURT: specifically that at the 
7 location of 220 West 300 South in Salt Lake County on 
8 the 13th of October of 1999, you intentionally, 
9 knowingly attempted to possess a controlled 
10 substance, specifically cocaine. Those facts and 
11 elements are true and correct; are they not? 
12 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
13 THE COURT: You understand that those 
14 facts and elements constitute: a Class A Misdemeanor 
15 crime for which you could be sentenced by this Court 
16 to a period of up to one year in the Salt Lake County 
17 Jail and/or fined up to the sum of $2,500 plus a 
18 surcharge on any fine imposed. Do you understand 
19 that? 
20 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
21 'THE COURT: Knowing the potential penalty 
22 involved here, do you want to proceed with this 
23 arrangement that the lawyers have worked out? 
24 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
25 THE COURT. And you are still doing it 
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1 freely and voluntarily? 
2 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I am. 
3 THE COURT: I will accept the Statement 
4 of the Defendant. I find that he's executed the same 
5 freely voluntarily and knowingly. 
6 To the charge set forth in the 
7 Information, Mr. Wheeler, which has now been amended, 
8 Count I, Attempted Unlawful Possession of a 
9 Controlled Substance, a Class A Misdemeanor, what is 
10 your plea? 
11 THE DEFENDANT: I'm guilty. 
12 THE COURT: I will accept the guilty plea 
13 and dismiss Count n of the Information in the 
14 interest of justice. 
15 Mr. Wheeler, you have the right now to be 
16 sentenced in this matter in no less than two nor more 
17 than 45 days from today's date. In addition, you 
18 have the right for good cause shown in no more than 
19 30 days from today's date to move to set aside the 
20 guilty plea entered here. 
21 I believe a presentence report would be 
22 appropriate. 
23 Ms. Kreeck Mendez, do you agree? 
24 MS. KREECK MENDEZ: Yes. 
25 THE COURT: We'll schedule the matter for 
BILLIE WAY. CCT 801-1*4-4041 
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1 sentencing... 
2 THE CLERK,.: January 7th. 
3 THE COURT: January the 7th. 
4 Mr. Wheeler, that is a Friday morning at 8:30. if ou 
5 be here with your lawyer for sentencing at that 
6 time. Do you 'understand? 
7 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
8 THE COURT: In the meantime, I am going 
9 to give you a referral slip here that you are to take 
10 with you. As soon as you leave this courtroom, you 
11 go to the Office of Adult Probation & Parole, which 
112 is listed on that slip, and give them the information 
13 they need to do the presentence report; got it? 
14 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Sir. 
15 THE COURT: Is there any reason known to 
16 the Prosecution why the Defendant shouldn't remain on 
117 release pending sentencing? 
18 MR. PARKER: No, Your Honor. 
19 THE COURT I am going to allow you, 
20 Mr. Wheeler, to remain out pending sentencing so long 
21 as you comply with the terms and conditions of your 
22 release without fail; do you follow me? 
23 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
24 THE COURT: All right Counsel, then if 
125 there's nothing further, then that will be the order. 
Page 10 
1 MS. KREECK MENDhz,; Okay, thank you. 
2 MR. PARKER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
3 (Hearing adjourned) 
4 
5 
6 " '• 
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1 P R O C E E D I N (J S 
2 (January 7, 2000.) 
3 THE COURT: Counsel, thank, you, This 
4 is State of Utah v. Shepard Wheeler, Case No. 
5 CR99-1193. 
6 Mr. Cony, have you 'been in touch "» ith 
? Mr 'Wheeler. 
8 MR. CORRY: "Y our Honor , Ms. Garland 
9 informed me that she has not been in touch with him 
10 and that he is not here this morning. 
11 THE COURT: Mr. Shepard Wheeler is not in 
12 the (courtroom? Or anyone on his behalf? 
13 I will, Counsel, make the determination 
11 at this stage that he's voluntarily absented himself 
15 from these proceedings. He entered a plea of guilt) 
16 on the 3rd of December of 1999, to the Class A 
17 Misdemeanor charge of Attempted Possession of a 
18 Controlled Substance, was directed to appear for 
19 presentence report; did not do so. A warrant was 
20 previously issued for his arrest. And given the fact 
21 that he has failed to comply with the Court's 
22 previous orders, 1 will sentence him to a period of 
23 one year in the Salt Lake County Jail; the commitment 
24 to be issued forthwith. 
25 Mr. Updegrove, if you will prepare the 
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i findings of fact and conclusions of law and order 
2 barring voluntarily termination and submit those to 
3 me, I'd appreciate i t 
4 And thank you, Mr. Cony. 
5 MR. CORRY: Thank you, Your Honor. 
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